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Abstract
A large portion of innovators do not patent their inventions. This is
a relative puzzle since innovators are often perceived to be at the mercy
of imitators in the absence of legal protection. In practice, innovators
however invest actively in making their products technologically hard to
reverse engineer. We consider the dynamics of imitation and investment
in technological complexity, both by the innovator and by imitators. We
show it can justify high level of proÖts beyond patents, can shed light on
the regulation of reverse engineering and can explain delays in adoption
of innovations.
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1 Introduction
Contrary to popular belief, a large share of innovators do not perceive patents
as the best way to protect their innovations. Ináuential surveys of managers
such as those by Levin et al. (1987) and Cohen et al. (2000) show that the
legal protection conferred by patents is by far less preferred than other means
of protection. This is conÖrmed by the results of the European CIS survey
(Arundel (2001)).
These surveys provide very conclusive evidence that patents are not nec-
essarily the best way to protect innovations. However, they are not very in-
formative on the speciÖc mechanism guaranteeing rents when patents are not
used. The options other than patents respondents can choose from are typi-
cally secrecy and lead time, which are not descriptive of the precise strategies
employed by Örms. One exception is the CIS survey that includes complexity
of product design as one of the choices. As documented in Arundel (2001),
this is one of the most popular means of protection, far above patents, both
for process and product innovations.1
In this paper we analyze formally the option available to innovators of in-
vesting in complexity to make their products harder to reverse engineer. Our
main point of is to show that the dynamics of investment in such protective
measures, by the innovator and by imitators, can explain some of the em-
pirical evidence previously mentioned. We show that Örms can collect very
high proÖts without patenting even in environments where investing in tech-
nological complexity is costly and subsequent imitation is cheap and not time-
consuming.
Concrete examples abound of how Örms can strategically invest to hamper
imitation e§orts. Ichijo (2010) illustrates this for some consumer electronics
products: îSharp has put tremendous e§orts into making imitation of its LCD
TV sets time consuming and di¢cult. Various initiatives at Kameyama are
aimed at increasing complexities (...) in order to make imitation di¢cultî.
The software industry is full of obfuscation strategies and tools designed to
1Arundel (2001) uses the 1993 CIS survey covering 7 European countries.
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interfere with reading of the machine code or its decompilation. Not only
software, but also hardware can be actively protected. For example, it is
quite typical in the semiconductor industry to encase some of the important
circuitry in epoxy blocks so that electronics are destroyed if someone tries to
open them.2 It is not unusual either to design the integrated circuits to have
pieces that are seemingly unused but are required for the operation (for details
and further examples, see Samuelson and Scotchmer (2002)). Finally, paying
high wages to reduce researcher mobility is also an important way to hamper
imitation.3
It may appear somewhat puzzling that innovators do not rely more heavily
on patents since they are often seen as helplessly at the mercy of rampant
imitation in the absence of legal protection. We argue in this paper that
the common wisdom that free-riding by imitators is extremely harmful for an
innovator misses two important aspects that our model with investments in
protective measures does capture. First, free-riders Önd themselves in a similar
situation to that of the innovator once they have imitated a protected inno-
vation. Thus, the original innovator beneÖts from the incentive of imitators
to keep imitation barriers high for those who have not yet imitated. Second,
the innovator also beneÖts from the incentive that imitators have to free-ride
on each other. If it is anticipated that the next imitator to enter will not
actively pursue protective measures, all remaining imitators have incentives
to delay their entry in the hope of beneÖting from the imitation e§ort of the
next one who happens to enter. These two aspects, coupled with the fact that
an innovator moves Örst when pursuing protective measures, explain why rent
dissipation may not be too severe.
All these ideas are formalized in an inÖnite-horizon model in which the
original innovator faces a potentially large pool of ex ante identical imitators
who are initially inactive. At every period, imitators who have not yet reverse
engineered the innovatorís technology decide whether to do so at some (pos-
2Another common way to reverse-engineer electronics and circuits is to use x-ray images
and work out what components have been used. For this reason, Örms try to hinder these
imitation e§orts by positioning parts in such a way that the x-ray recognition is hampered.
3See Henry and Ruiz-Aliseda (2012) for an application of our model to labor mobility.
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sibly low) imitation cost ci. If they do, they also decide whether or not to
pay a given one-time protection cost cp (investing in technological complex-
ity). If all previous entrants have paid cp, the cost of reverse engineering for
the remaining imitators is ci. If at least one of them did not, the innovation
becomes freely available. Protection technologies are characterized by their
cost, cp, and the strength they confer, ci.
We Önd in this context that the innovator can earn substantial rents, even
in a very unfavorable environment, where for instance imitation is not time-
consuming. Such high (post-innovation) rents may also be well above those
attained by imitators. Surprisingly, the protection technologies that tend to
yield a high payo§ for the innovator are expensive and do not protect very well
(relatively high cp and small ci). The intuition behind this result is as follows.
The fact that the protection technology is relatively expensive means that the
innovator uses it but, upon entry, imitators do not. Thus, as soon as the Örst
imitator enters, the knowledge necessary to reproduce the technology enters
the public domain and all remaining imitators enter for free. This creates a
strong incentive for imitators to try to free-ride on other imitatorsí reverse
engineering e§orts and thus delay entry, which leaves potentially very high
proÖts to the innovator. Our theory can explain the previously mentioned
survey evidence and can shed light on why innovation was observed to áourish
in sectors where legal protection did not exist and technologies to increase
complexity were used, such as in the software industry.
We focused our previous discussion on the most proÖtable protection tech-
nology, but we characterize in the paper the symmetric mixed-strategy equi-
libria for arbitrary technologies. This leads us to characterize a theoretically
interesting pattern where typically a series of preemption games is followed
with some probability by a waiting game. Imitators are involved in a series
of preemption games taking place quasi-instantaneously at the outset of the
game. All the imitators who happen to enter in this phase pay the protection
cost, but fear mis-coordination and thus mix at each instant between waiting
and imitating. They invest in complexity in the hope of securing some rents,
anticipating that the initial phase of massive entry will be followed with some
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probability by a waiting game played by the imitators left to enter. Such a
game involving delayed imitation arises because once a su¢cient number of
imitators have entered, the protection cost is too large relative to the post-
entry payo§, and hence the next imitator to enter does so without investing
in complexity. These imitators thus engage in a waiting game and delay entry
in the hope that another imitator enters before them.
Our theory thus predicts an interesting pattern of entry by imitators: a
certain number of Örms quasi simultaneously enter, and the remaining imita-
tors then wait to enter until one of them chooses to do so, followed by all the
others. If the process of di§usion of new technologies is a process of imitation,
this provides a strategic explanation for the well documented delay in di§usion
(see survey by Hoppe (2002)). We show that this delay is increasing in ci and
cp and show it is coherent with some preliminary statistical evidence. Our
theory also has distinctive features for the pattern of entry that could allow
to empirically distinguish it from other strategic explanations for delay.
We also show that our results can enrich the debate on when reverse en-
gineering should be regulated. As stated in Samuelson and Scotchmer (2002),
ìreverse engineering has always been a lawful way to acquire a trade secret
as long as acquisition of the known product is by a fair and honest means".
The authors nevertheless emphasize that attempts have been made in certain
industries to legally restrict reverse engineering (such as the 1984 Semicon-
ductor Chip Protection Act (SCPA)). Samuelson and Scotchmer (2002) argue
that lead time before reverse engineers can enter and costliness of reverse en-
gineering provide natural protection, but when these barriers disappear, legis-
lation might be needed. Our paper complements this analysis by introducing
dynamic considerations and introducing another dimension that can evolve
through time, the cost of technical protection cp. An increase in cp can in-
crease proÖts of the innovator, even when imitation is not time consuming and
is not very costly.
There is a growing literature discussed below on mechanisms that can gen-
erate proÖts for innovators in the absence of patents (new stream of papers
following Boldrin and Levine (2002, 2008a, 2008b)). However, these papers
4
do not address directly the empirical puzzle presented by the seminal surveys
of Levin et al. (1987) and Cohen et al. (2000). We take a di§erent approach
and focus on one dimension apparent in these surveys and of large empirical
relevance: the choice between patents and protection through technical com-
plexity. This allows us to draw important implications not only for proÖts, but
also on regulation of reverse engineering and on di§usion paths of innovations.
One strand of the literature examines the choice between patents and se-
crecy (see survey by Hall et al. (2012)). However, all of these papers consider
secrecy as the default option when patents are not used without focusing on
the precise strategy used by Örms to generate proÖts when not patenting.
Horstmann, MacDonald and Slivinski (1985) emphasize the signaling dimen-
sion of patents in an environment where innovators have private information
on the value of imitation for potential imitators, whereas Gallini (1992) is in-
terested in analyzing the optimal trade-o§ between patent length and breadth.
Kultti et al. (2007) deal with the comparison between patenting and secrecy
in a setting with multiple independent discoveries and where the idea be-
comes public under secrecy with a certain exogenous probability. Anton and
Yao (2004), Maurer and Scotchmer (2002) and Henry and Ponce (2011) do
consider precise strategies such as disclosure decisions or licensing, but these
strategies cannot be tied directly to the evidence provided in the survey.
A second strand of the literature examines how innovators can disclose the
value of their inventions without being expropriated, in an environment with
weak property rights. This essential topic (dating back to Arrow (1962)) is
however not as directly linked to the evidence presented in the surveys where
the respondents are typically not entrepreneurs in small startups.4 Anton and
Yao (1994, 2002) analyze how a Önancially-constrained innovator with an in-
novative idea can earn substantial post-innovation rents even if her idea can
be expropriated when revealed to either of two Örms capable of commercial-
izing it. In turn, Baccara and Razin (2007) analyze the incentives to disclose
ideas when there is possibly more than one innovator with the same idea and
4The issue of selling the idea is less relevant for larger Örms that are not Önancially
constrained and can commercialize products on their own unlike entrepreneurs.
5
patenting is not feasible.
Our paper also contributes to the literatures on adoption of new technolo-
gies and on entry games with an inÖnite horizon of play, both of which are
interrelated. Our game exhibits a theoretically interesting pattern of a series
of preemption games followed by a waiting game. Our approach towards an-
alyzing continuous-time preemption games builds upon the technology adop-
tion model of Fudenberg and Tirole (1985), except that we have more than
two players (possibly) mixing over more than two actions. The existence of
equilibrium coordination failures directly relates our work to that of Dixit and
Shapiro (1986), Vettas (2000) and Bertomeu (2009). Vettas (2000) is of partic-
ular relevance because he Önds the remarkable result that the payo§ expected
by an incumbent Örst increases then decreases as more Örms become active in
the market. A similar nonmonotonicity result is derived in our setting, even
though we allow áow proÖts to strictly decrease in the number of Örms active
in the market, unlike Vettas (2000). Our focus on continuous time allows us to
dispense with his assumption, showing that his insights carry over to settings
in which decisions can be made very often.5
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we intro-
duce the model. In Section 3 we solve for the equilibrium entry and protection
decisions. In Section 4 we draw conclusions on innovatorís proÖts and patterns
of entry and di§usion, while Section 5 concludes. All proofs are presented in
the appendix.
2 Model
We analyze a discrete-time game that lasts inÖnitely many periods of length
 > 0 each. The time variable is denoted by t = 0;; 2; :::. All players have
the same per-period discount factor . We will focus on the case in which 
is positive but converges to zero, i.e., the continuous-time limit of the game.
The game involves one innovator and n1  2 (ex ante identical) potential
5Only a few papers consider entry timing games that display both preemption and waiting
motives as play unfolds: Sahuguet (2006) and Park and Smith (2008) for instance.
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imitators. Prior to the start of the game, the innovator has discovered a new
technology. The imitators can then decide in each period whether to imitate
or stay out of the market an additional period. We consider the dynamics of
imitation of this technology. The cost of imitation depends on the strategic
choices made by the innovator and the imitators who previously entered. In
any period t, we refer to the players who have already entered the market as
"insiders", whereas we refer to the imitators who have not yet entered as the
"outsiders".
The innovator at time t = 0 and the imitators upon entry need to decide
whether to invest in protection. Protection technologies are characterized by
two parameters ci and cp. We denote cp > 0 for the one-time cost that needs
to be incurred to achieve protection. In any period, if the innovator and all
insiders incurred the protection cost cp > 0, the outsiders who decide to enter
need to incur imitation cost ci > 0. This one-time cost ci gives instantaneous
access to the same technology (see Henry and Ruiz-Aliseda (2012) for stochas-
tic protection where a Örm who pays cp is uncertain of whether her technology
can be successfully imitated by an imitator who pays ci). However, if one of
the insiders did not pay cp upon entry, then imitation becomes costless for all
outsiders. We assume that the costs cp and ci remain Öxed throughout the
game, in particular they are independent of the number of Örms active in the
market.6
In each period, an outsider can therefore choose among three actions:
 to imitate and pay the protection cost, an action denoted by p
 to imitate and not pay the protection cost, an action denoted by u
 not to imitate and wait another period, an action denoted by w
Per-period proÖts depend on the number of Örms who have entered. We
denote j for the per-period individual proÖt if j 2 f1; :::; ng Örms (including
6see Henry and Ruiz-Aliseda (2012) section 5 for a micro foundation for cp based on a
model of researcher mobility.
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the innovator) hold the technology.7 Denoting the rate at which proÖts are
discounted by Örms by r > 0, let j  j=r represent the value of a perpetual
stream of discounted proÖts collected by a Örm when a total of j 2 f1; :::; ng
Örms hold the technology and no further entry takes place. We assume j and
thus j are decreasing, with n > 0.
We mostly focus, in particular in Section 3, on the case in which n > ci.
This corresponds to a situation where all Örms will eventually enter the market:
even if n  1 Örms are already on the market and all the insiders and the
innovator paid the protection cost cp, imitation is still proÖtable. Note that
this is a priori the worst-case scenario for innovation in the absence of legal
protection since the protection technology does not o§er much of a guarantee.
At the end of the section, we consider the case n < ci and show that the
result are very similar, up to a notational change.
We allow for mixed strategies and focus on symmetric Markov Perfect
Equilibria (MPE), where the state corresponds to the number of Örms who hold
the technology. The focus on symmetric (mixed-strategy) equilibria can appear
restrictive. However, as Farrell and Saloner (1988) and Bolton and Farrell
(1990) convincingly argue, decentralized coordination mechanisms involving
anonymous players cannot be properly captured by asymmetric equilibria in
which (asymmetric) roles are very well deÖned among players. In addition,
play based on mixed strategies can be interpreted as play arising in a game
in which each player has private information about some disturbance a§ecting
her Önal payo§.8 Coordination failures occur under this interpretation not
because of randomization but because players have incomplete information
about othersí payo§s.
Given our restriction on Markovian play, we use the following notation
throughout. Thus, at the start of a period with k outsiders left to enter, we
7To avoid introducing several e§ects that would obscure the message of the paper, we
assume that the áow proÖts earned do not depend on whether the protection cost was
incurred or not. In other words, making the technology harder to reverse engineer does
not directly a§ect the willingness to pay of consumers or production costs. However, the
mechanics of the model would be preserved if this additional feature was introduced.
8This is the well-known puriÖcation argument in Harsanyi (1973).
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denote:
 the expected discounted proÖts of an insider by Ik
 the expected discounted proÖts of an outsider by Ok
3 The dynamics of protection and imitation
In this section, we mainly focus on the characterization of the equilibria, in
the case where n > ci (we consider the other case at the end of the section).
To help the reader through the arguments, we Örst sketch the shape of the
equilibrium. The Öniteness of the pool of potential imitators allows us to use
backward induction when solving the inÖnite-horizon game, so we explain the
reasoning by working backwards as well.
In the Önal subgames, when many Örms are already active, the protection
cost cp appears large compared to the expected proÖts on the market. The
next entrant will thus enter without any protective measure, thereby creating
an incentive for the remaining imitators to delay imitation in the hope of free
riding on the e§orts of the next to enter. We actually Önd a critical number
of outsiders J such that if the number of outsiders is strictly less than J , they
engage in a waiting game and delay entry.
In earlier subgames with at least J outsiders, there is an incentive for
imitators to enter quickly, preempt the others by protecting their technologies
and beneÖt from the subsequent imitation delay. However, there is a risk of
miscoordination were all imitators to enter simultaneously. This creates the
conditions for a preemption game. In such a game, at least one outsider will
enter right away (and several could in fact enter simultaneously). If the number
of outsiders is still not below J following this wave of entry, another preemption
game is played, and so on and so forth until the number of outsiders is Önally
smaller than J . Overall, we see that the pattern is a series of preemption
games followed by a waiting game. Below, we make these arguments formal.
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3.1 Solving the subgames with less than three outsiders
We note that in any subgame in which at least one of the insiders did not
pay the protection cost upon entry, all outsiders immediately imitate the tech-
nology at no cost. Thus in the following discussion, we exclusively focus on
subgames in which all insiders paid cp upon entry.
The last entrant
We begin our analysis by considering those subgames in which just one
imitator is left to enter the market. Since n > ci, the last outsider enters
immediately without paying cp. The expected proÖt of an insider in such a
subgame is I1 = n. The expected proÖt of the outsider is O1 = n  ci.
Two imitators left to enter
We now consider the subgames with only two outsiders. The outsider who
enters Örst needs to incur cost ci, but knows that, regardless of whether or
not she pays the additional protection cost, the remaining outsider will enter
immediately. It is then clear that action p (entering and paying the protection
cost) is strictly dominated.
Therefore, the Örst entrant does not choose protection, and the second
entrant incurs no imitation cost. This creates the conditions for a waiting game
in which both players mix between entering without paying the protection cost
and waiting. Both players prefer to be the second entrant, but also do not want
to wait excessively as they lose proÖts every period. As is standard in such
games (if stationary), in the limit when  converges to zero, the entry time of
each imitator converges to an exponential distribution.
Lemma 1 In subgames with two outsiders, the only symmetric MPE is such
that both outsiders mix between actions u (entering without paying the protec-
tion cost) and w (waiting another period). As  converges to zero, the entry
time of each outsider converges to an exponential distribution with parameter
2, where 2  r(n  ci)=ci. The expected proÖt of each outsider is O2 =
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n ci, whereas each of the insiders expects to gain I2 = 2n2+(12)n,
where 2  r=(r + 22).
The expected payo§ of an outsider at the beginning of these subgames
is O2 = n  ci since she is indi§erent between all entry times, including
entering immediately. On the contrary, the insiders expect signiÖcant proÖts
since they will earn per-period proÖts n2 until the time of Örst entry, which
is exponentially distributed (with hazard rate 22).9
Three imitators left to enter
Before studying the complete dynamics, it is useful to understand in detail
the resolution of subgames with three outsiders left. The results will partially
extend to the case with more than three outsiders, but with some important
di§erences highlighted in section 3.2. All players know that in any period,
if a single outsider enters and pays the protection cost, the remaining two
imitators will play a waiting game. In such a game, we established in Lemma
1 that insiders earn expected proÖts of I2 = 2n2 + (1 2)n.
Thus, we Örst note that, if I2  cp  ci  n  ci, playing action p is
(weakly) dominated by u, that is, outsiders will never pay the protection cost.
The condition can be equivalently expressed as cp  c2  2(n2  n).
According to the same logic as in the previous section, the three imitators
will then engage in a waiting game. We show in Lemma 2 below that the
individual entry time then follows an exponential distribution with parameter
3  r(n  ci)=(2ci).
On the contrary, if cp < c2, preemptively entering and paying the protection
cost becomes very attractive if the two other outsiders do not enter. There
is however a risk of coordination failure were all outsiders simultaneously to
enter and pay cp. This creates the conditions for a preemption game described
in Lemma 2. As the time between two consecutive periods shrinks, outsiders
essentially mix between p and w, that is, between entering with protection
9Indeed, the entry time of each individual imitator follows an exponential distribution
with parameter 2, and thus the time of Örst entry is exponentially distributed with para-
meter 22, since it is the minimum of two exponential random variables.
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and waiting. Entry occurs almost instantaneously with probability one, and
simultaneous entry of several outsiders occurs with positive probability.
Lemma 2 In subgames with three outsiders, as  converges to zero:
(i) If cp  c2, the three outsiders mix between actions u and p. The entry
time of each outsider converges to an exponential distribution with parameter
3, where 3  r(n  ci)=(2ci). Furthermore, the expected proÖt of each
outsider is O3 = n  ci, whereas each of the insiders expects to gain I3 =
3n3 + (1 3)n, where 3  r=(r + 33).
(ii) If instead cp < c2, the three outsiders start playing a preemption game
as soon as this subgame begins. The limiting distribution is such that outsiders
play w and p with a probability bounded away from zero, and the payo§ of
the outsiders converges to O3 = n  ci, whereas the payo§ of the insiders
converges to I3 = 3(1)I2 + (1  3(1))n, where 3(1) is the probability of a
single outsider entering.10
Lemma 2 has a very natural interpretation. If the protection cost is rela-
tively high, it will not be paid upon entry, and therefore all outsiders wait in
the hope that one of them will move Örst without paying cp. On the contrary,
if the protection cost is low enough, it will be incurred upon entry. The prob-
lem is then one of coordination. All outsiders would like to be the only Örm to
enter and then enjoy payo§ I2 while the others engage in a waiting game, but
no one has an interest in paying the protection cost if other outsiders choose
to enter at the same time.
3.2 Subgames with more than three imitators left to
enter
The ideas uncovered in the subgames with three outsiders partially extend to
the subgames with a larger number of outsiders. However, it becomes more
technically and conceptually challenging since a sequence of preemption games
can now occur and the probabilities of entry are thus deÖned recursively. In
10See expression (7) in the appendix for the speciÖc formula for 3(1).
12
the three-Örm case, there was a single preemption and game and we could thus
derive probabilities explicitly and take the limit for small values of . We now
take a di§erent approach and consider a continuous time approximation of
equilibrium play and show below that it is arbitrarily close to actual play. We
obtain the following result:
Proposition 1 When n > ci, in the continuous time limit of the game, the
symmetric MPE exhibits the following properties: there exists a number of
entrants J 2 f3; :::; ng such that, if the innovator initially paid cp:
1. At least J outsiders quasi-instantaneously imitate and pay the protection
cost.
2. The remaining outsiders, if there are more than one, delay imitation for
a random length of time and do not pay for protection upon imitation
3. After one of them enters without paying the protection cost, all the re-
maining outsiders immediately imitate.
The overall shape of entry is very similar to the three-Örm case. In par-
ticular, there exists a critical number of outsiders J such that as long as the
number of outsiders is greater or equal than J , they try to preempt each other,
whereas they play a waiting game as soon as the number of outsiders crosses
this threshold. In Section 4, we focus on the implications of these results.
Below we explain the di§erent building blocks behind Proposition 1.
In what follows, let ck  k(nkn), where k  r=(r+kk). We show
in the following lemma that in the subgame with k  3 outsiders, if cp  ck1,
players mix between waiting and entering without protection and the entry
time is exponentially distributed. A key part of the induction argument is
that fckgn1k=2 is a monotonically increasing sequence.11 This implies that, when
cp  ck1, if one outsider chooses to enter by paying the protection cost, the
11Note that k = (k  1)ci=(kn  ci) is increasing in k, since ci < n implies that
dk=dk = ci(n  ci)=(kn  ci)2 > 0. Taking into account that both k and nk  n
are positive, the fact that nk and k are both increasing in k then yields that c

2 < c

3 <
::: < cn1.
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k 1 remaining outsiders will then engage in a waiting game, since cp > ck2.
Intuitively, the incentive to avoid paying the protection cost becomes more
intense as fewer imitators remain inactive: as k decreases, the proÖt stream
to be earned following entry becomes relatively smaller and the waiting game
is expected to last less (note that nk is increasing in k, whereas kk is
decreasing).
Lemma 3 In the subgame with k 2 f3; :::; n  1g outsiders, if cp  ck1, the
k outsiders mix between actions u and w. The entry time of each outsider
converges as  goes to zero to an exponential distribution with parameter kk,
where k  r(nci)=((k1)ci). The expected proÖt of each outsider is Ok =
nci, whereas each of the insiders expects to gain Ik = knk+(1k)n,
where k  r=(r + kk).
We now consider the more complex case with k  3 outsiders and cp < ck1.
It is essential for our purposes to deÖne J , the critical number of outsiders such
that a waiting game is played if the number of outsiders is strictly less than
J (i.e., in subgames in which the number of imitators left to enter equals
2; :::; J  1). Formally, we have J = inffk  3 : cp < ck1g, where J = n if it
is not well deÖned. Note that J is a step function of cp ranging from 3 to n.
We will now show that for k  J , a series of preemption games takes place. A
priori, the players mix between the three available actions, w, p and u.12
Recall that we are interested in equilibria where players can react instan-
taneously to each others actions, i.e in situations where the time  between
successive play is negligible.13 In what follows, we will not be deriving the
exact play in a symmetric equilibrium for small values of  but consider a
continuous-time approximation of equilibrium play that is arbitrarily close to
the true outcome.
12We will show when proving Lemma 4 that action u is chosen, but with vanishing prob-
ability as  goes to zero.
13As emphasized by Fudenberg and Tirole (1991) when dealing with preemption games,
a continuous-time version of the game cannot be directly used, and one is forced either to
use approximations based on discrete-time games or to properly expand strategy spaces to
accommodate for such approximations, as done by Fudenberg and Tirole (1985).
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More speciÖcally, the approach will be the following. For a given period
length , let a;k()  0 be the probability with which each outsider plays
action a 2 fw; p; ug when k outsiders are left to enter. Also, let Va;k() de-
note the outsiderís payo§ from choosing action a given that the k  1 other
players are mixing over actions with probability a;k() in all subgames with
k outsiders. In equilibrium, the mixing probabilities a;k() for a 2 fw; p; ug
must be such that outsiders are indi§erent between all three actions and
such that these are indeed probabilities (i.e. Vp;k() = Vu;k() = Vw;k(),
a;k() 2 (0; 1) and
P
a2fw;p;ug a;k() = 1). What we will do is to solve for
the solution of this system for  = 0, what we call the continuous-time ap-
proximation of the equilibrium,14 and we will show that this solution exists
and is unique. Given that the value functions Va;k()(a 2 fw; p; ug) are con-
tinuous in  and in the probabilities, this will be a close approximation of the
equilibrium outcome for small enough values of .
To illustrate further this method, consider the case of three players solved
in the proof of Lemma 2. In that case we solved explicitly, for a small Öxed
value of , for the probabilities a;3(), a 2 fw; p; ug (see (5) and (6) in the
appendix). We see from the solution presented in the proof of Lemma 2, that
taking the limit of all the probabilities as  converges to zero (as we did) leads
to the same solution as directly solving the system consisting of equations (2)-
(4) for  = 0, as was to be expected due to the continuity of the system. From
now on, a;k and Va;k shall respectively denote a;k() and Va;k() for  = 0.
We formally show in the proof of Lemma 4 below that the symmetric
MPE can be approximated for small enough values of  by an equilibrium
where the action of entering without protection is played with essentially zero
probability, i.e., u;k  0. Thus, in the approximation we consider, the players
will essentially mix just between actions w and p. We denote k  p;k for the
individual probability of entry (so we have w;k  1 k). Given k outsiders,
14Formally, what we mean by (continuous-time) approximation of the equilibrium is a set
of admissible mixing probabilities a;k (a 2 fp; u; wg) satisfying the following property: for
any (small)  > 0, there exists  such that  <  implies that ja;k()a;kj < , where
a:k() is the exact equilibrium play.
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the payo§ to choosing action p is given by
Vp;k =
k1X
l=0
C lk1(k)
l(1 k)k1lIk1l  cp  ci,
where C lk1 =

k1
l

denotes the binomial coe¢cient indexed by k  1 and l.
The value to an outsider of paying the protection cost when entering depends
on how many other outsiders simultaneously enter. If l other outsiders enter,
the outsider participates in the next period as an insider in a subgame with
k  1 l outsiders. Her expected gain in this case is thus Ik1l (the value of
being an incumbent with k  1 l outsiders).
Each of the k outsiders will mix between p and w so as to leave others
indi§erent between these two actions, which yields that
Vp;k = n  ci,
since it can be shown that an outsiderís payo§ to waiting is Vw;k = n ci for
 = 0. Letting Ik1l  Ik1l  n and
Fk() 
k1X
l=0
C lk1 
l(1 )k1l Ik1l,
the indi§erence condition can be equivalently written as:
Fk(k) = cp. (1)
Thus, we have in subgames with k imitators left to enter (and such that
cp < c

k1) that the approximate mixing probability (provided it exists) must
solve Fk(k) = cp. Largely inspired by Vettas (2000), we now exploit the
recursive nature of the problem and the properties of Fk(). We show that the
symmetric MPE of the game can be approximated for small values of  by
an equilibrium such that outsiders mix between actions p and w with strictly
positive probabilities. Furthermore, in this approximation, the probability of
playing action p in equilibrium decreases as the number of outsiders decreases.
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The main properties of the Fk() functions, for k 2 fJ; :::; n  1g, are
presented in Figure 1.
Figure 1: F5() (solid curve), F4() (dashed curve) and F3() (thick solid
curve) plotted for n = 6, cp = 0:0017, ci = 0:02 and j = (j + 1)2 (J = 3
under these assumptions)
It holds that FJ() is strictly decreasing in , with FJ(0) > cp > FJ(1).
There is thus clearly a unique solution to FJ() = cp, namely J . This is
intuitive: when k = J , following entry by at least one outsider, preemptive
motives disappear and a waiting game is played thereafter (by deÖnition of
J). The length of such a waiting game is determined by the number of other
outsiders who enter. Given our previous Önding that the continuation payo§
of an insider is lower in a waiting game played by fewer outsiders, the best
scenario is if no one else enters ( = 0), whereas the worst scenario is if
everyone else enters ( = 1). The randomization performed in equilibrium is
somewhere in between.
For k > J , the pattern is slightly di§erent. In these cases Fk() is not
everywhere decreasing in . Unlike the case in which k = J , larger  does
not make lower continuation payo§s more likely. Indeed, it can be shown (see
proof of Lemma 4) that the continuation payo§ of an insider (net of n) has
an inverted-U shape as a function of k: In1 < In2 < ::: < IJ < IJ1 and
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IJ1 > IJ2::: > I0 = 0. So Fk() also has an inverted-U shape as a function
of . Furthermore, we can show that Fk(0) > cp > Fk(1), for all k > J .
There is additional structure that can be exploited. In particular, Fk+1()
starts o§ below Fk(), reaches its maximum when crossing Fk() and then
remains above Fk(). A direct consequence is that the equilibrium k is in-
creasing in k, an intuitive property. In these preemption games, players want
to rush to enter to become one of the insiders during the waiting game that
will likely follow. There is however a risk of excessive entry ex post. In a
subgame where many players have already entered, and hence k is close to J ,
this risk becomes particularly severe, and the players in equilibrium therefore
chose to enter with a lower probability. The following lemma formalizes all
these ideas.
Lemma 4 In subgames with k 2 fJ; :::; n  1g outsiders, if cp < ck1, then,
for small enough , the symmetric MPE can be approximated by the following
equilibrium:
(i) Outsiders mix only between actions p and w, and the probability k of
playing p is uniquely given by the solution to Fk(k) = cp.
(ii) k is increasing in k.
(iii) Quasi-instantaneous entry by at least one outsider occurs.
We are now in a position to show that the results of Proposition 1 partially
extend to the case where ci  n, a situation that for large enough values
of n approximates free entry. In particular, there exists a critical value J 0
such that if the number of outsiders is larger or equal to J 0, outsiders mix
between actions p and w and at least J 0 quasi instantaneously enter. The
main di§erence is that if the number of outsiders is less than J 0, no further
entry takes place whereas in the case ci < n, all players play a waiting game
and eventually enter. We derive the value of J 0 below.
In situations where ci  n, action u is always dominated byw if all insiders
have paid cp, since playing u yields payo§ n ci  0. Letting c0k  nk ci
in what follows, J 0 is then deÖned by J 0  inffk  3 : cp < c0k1g (with J 0 = n
if the deÖnition is vacuous), so that subgames with k  J 01 outsiders exhibit
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no further entry.15 Lemmas 1-4 are then directly applicable by simply letting
ci = n and redeÖning ck and J as c
0
k  nk ci and J 0, respectively. Hence,
the case in which ci  n corresponds to that in which imitation delays in
subgames without preemption features are inÖnitely long. Proposition 1 then
applies accounting for this new notation and the fact that the imitation delay
after the initial preemptive imitation phase is inÖnite.
4 Using complexity: returns to R&D and dif-
fusion of innovations
We can use the results of the previous section to draw important implications
on incentives to innovate and patterns of entry of imitators. We Örst show
that our model and the mechanism we consider can explain why innovation
áourished in certain sectors even when patents were not available. Second, by
examining how proÖts of innovators vary with the characteristics of technical
protection we can shed some light on the need for regulation of reverse engi-
neering. Finally we show our results can have important implications for the
patterns of entry in innovative industries as well as the di§usion of innovations.
4.1 High proÖts outside patents
Even though we consider an environment a priori very unfavorable to innova-
tors, where in particular imitation is instantaneous, our Örst result shows that
proÖts of innovators can be very high even when patents are not available or
are not chosen.
Proposition 2 In the continuous-time limit of the game, the equilibrium pay-
o§ of the innovator can be arbitrarily close to 1  2. This happens for
technologies that are such that cp # 2 and either ci  n or ci " n.
Interestingly, the maximum proÖt 1  2 is attained for a protection
technology that is expensive (cp = 2) and potentially does not perform very
15Since it holds that n(J01)  ci > cp  n(J02)  ci by deÖnition of J 0.
19
well (ci close but less than n).
The intuition behind this result for ci < n is as follows: the fact that the
protection technology is expensive (cp  2) means that, upon entry, imitators
do not use it. Thus, as soon as the Örst imitator enters, the knowledge neces-
sary to reproduce the technology enters the public domain and all remaining
imitators enter for free. This creates a strong incentive for all imitators to try
to free-ride on other imitatorsí e§orts. The incentive to enter Örst converges
to zero when ci approaches n, and thus waiting is inÖnitely long and the
innovatorís payo§ converges to 1. Of course, she has to pay a protection cost
that, in the most favorable case, is equal 2. For such a technology, the payo§
to the innovator is thus high even in environments with no legal protection.16
Our model can thus explain the evidence in the surveys mentioned in the
introduction and why innovation áourished in certain sectors where patent
protection was not available and investment to increase complexity were fea-
sible. Consider the software industry. Until recently, software was not covered
by patents and it was common for inventors to obfuscate the code: in other
words, transforming the readable source code into code di¢cult to use directly.
Today, various techniques are available and appear to be relatively cheap (low
cp). But this was not always the case and our theory could help explain why,
even though patents did not apply, this was nevertheless an industry charac-
terized by relentless innovation (see Boldrin and Levine (2007)).
There is unfortunately no data available on the level of cp for di§erent
technologies. It is however interesting to pay attention to the sectors in which
patents are judged to be least e§ective according to surveys of managers (Co-
hen et al. 2000), such as electronic components and semiconductors (the
software industry is not part of the survey). These are also the sectors in
which protection technologies can be most commonly observed. For instance,
hardware obfuscation is a technique by which the description or the structure
of electronic hardware is modiÖed to intentionally conceal its functionality,
16The case ci  n is equivalent to ci " n as in both cases the imitation delays are
inÖnitely long.
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making it signiÖcantly more di¢cult to reverse engineer.17 We also observe
technologies for sale that allow protection of integrated circuits from reverse
engineering.18
4.2 On the need for regulation of reverse engineering
As stated in Samuelson and Scotchmer (2002), ìreverse engineering has always
been a lawful way to acquire a trade secret as long as acquisition of the known
product is by a fair and honest means". The authors nevertheless emphasize
that attempts have been made in certain industries to legally restrict the use
of reverse engineering. The most prominent example is the introduction of the
Semiconductor Chip Protection Act (SCPA) in 1984 designed to protect chip
layout from reverse engineering.
Samuelson and Scotchmer (2002) argue that lead time before reverse engi-
neers can enter and costliness of reverse engineering provide natural protection,
but when these barriers disappear, legislation might be needed. In fact, it is
argued that one of the reasons for the introduction of SCPA was a fall in the
cost of copying (a fall in ci in the terminology of our model). Our paper com-
plements this analysis by introducing dynamic considerations and introducing
another dimension that can evolve through time, the cost of technical protec-
tion cp, an aspect previously neglected. We in fact show that when dynamics
of protection are considered, lags and high cost of copying are not necessary
to guarantee proÖts since in our model we have no lags and we consider small
values of ci. The dynamic reasons we unveil is that imitators endogenously
want to keep barriers to entry high and they also want to free ride on each
otherís copying e§orts.
As the result of the previous subsection suggests, a high value of cp can ac-
tually have a positive e§ect on the innovatorís proÖts and thus reduce the need
for legislation restricting reverse engineering. In this section we characterize
17There are other techniques, some cryptography-based.
18An example is given by the United States patent 7128271, described as ìa semicon-
ductor integrated circuit having a reverse engineering protection part that can be easily
implementedî.
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more fully the shape of proÖts as a function of the characteristics of technical
protection. We conÖrm that a drop in cp can decrease proÖts. In other words
it is possible the SCPA was driven not only by a drop in ci, but possibly also
by a simultaneous drop in cp.
Let us Örst examine how the proÖts of the innovator vary with the charac-
teristics of the protection technology. We plot in Figure 2, for a given value
of ci, how the innovatorís payo§ (net of the protection cost) varies with cp.
The pattern observed in Figure 2 is typically found for di§erent speciÖcations
of parameters. First, when cp is less than c2, the net proÖts of the innovator
initially increase and then decrease with cp until cp reaches c2. Second, the
behavior in the following intervals (ck1; c

k) (for 3  k  n 2) is as follows:
the proÖts of the innovator decrease and reach n as cp approaches the upper
bound of the interval. Third, when cp goes above that upper bound we observe
a discrete upward jump. Finally, when cp is above cn2, net proÖts are linearly
decreasing in cp.
Figure 2: I5  cp plotted against cp for n = 6, ci = 0:02 and j = (j + 1)2
The key to understanding these e§ects is to notice that within an interval
(ck1; c

k), the value of J (the critical number of Örms such that a waiting game
starts) remains Öxed. Within such an interval, an increase in cp generates two
opposing forces. On the one hand, clearly an increase in cp directly decreases
the payo§ of the innovator as he has to pay a higher protection cost. On the
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other hand, an increase in cp decreases the probability of excessive entry in
the preemption phase.
The second e§ect can be understood as follows. When cp is smaller than the
upper bound of the interval, outsiders imitate in each period of the preemption
phase with some probability. Excessive entry above J thus happens with
positive probability, at a cost for the innovator. As cp increases, outsiders in
any preemption subgame coordinate their actions better and better. As cp
gets close to the upper bound of the interval, the mixing probability in any
subgame of the preemption phase converges to zero as the gains from entering
before the others becomes small. The probability that at least two outsiders
simultaneously enter in the same period converges even faster to zero. Thus,
the outsiders perfectly coordinate their entry, and in equilibrium exactly J
enter quasi instantaneously in a sequential manner.19 So, as cp increases, this
second e§ect increases the proÖts of the innovator because of the lower risk of
miscoordination when entering.
Figure 2 suggests that the Örst e§ect dominates only at the start of the
Örst interval; in the other intervals, the second e§ect dominates. Note that if
cp  cn1, there is no preemption phase so only the Örst e§ect plays a role
and proÖts linearly decrease with cp. The previous discussion also allows us
to explain why proÖts converge to n at the upper bounds of the intervals
(ck1; c

k). Because of the almost perfect coordination we highlighted when cp
approaches ck, the gross proÖts of the innovator In1 are equal to the proÖts
when k outsiders remain, Ik. Since ck = Ik  n, Ik  cp and hence In1  cp
both go to n if cp is close to the upper limit of the interval.
Figure 2 also clearly illustrates a discrete upward jump in the innovatorís
net payo§ as cp passes just above ck. Although the value of cp is quite similar
on both sides of the threshold, the critical value J increases by one unit as soon
as this threshold is crossed. This discretely increases IJ1, which means that
imitation delays involve more Örms and hence being an insider is more valuable.
19Note that in Fudenberg and Tirole (1985) coordination failures do not occur on the
equilibrium path even if players randomize independently, as in our case when cp is close to
the upper bound of the interval.
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This favors the innovator, but the downside is that the potential entrants Önd
entry more attractive and choose to enter with higher probability than when
cp is just below ck, thus leading to more miscoordination. However, as our
previous discussion suggests, this faster rate of imitation does not completely
dissipate the greater proÖt triggered by the unit increase in J .
Some of the results highlighted in Figure 2 are stated formally in the fol-
lowing lemma:
Lemma 5 Fix an interval (ck1; c

k) for 2  k  n  1 (with c1  0 and
cn1  1). Then the following properties hold:
(i) As cp converges to ck from below (2  k  n  2), net proÖts for the
innovator converge to n from above
(ii) As cp converges to 0 from above, net proÖts for the innovator converge
to n from above
(iii) As cp decreases starting from cn2, net proÖts for the innovator fall
linearly
The pattern we uncover conÖrms that the parameter cp should be a rele-
vant dimension when considering legislation to regulate reverse engineering. It
suggests that, on average, higher values of cp can increase proÖts of Örms. Of
course, Figure 2 is characterized by discontinuities in the shape of proÖts, con-
Örmed in the result of Lemma 3. In fact, this Ögure corresponds to the proÖts
of the innovator for a particular product/technology. Policy makers would
be interested more in the e§ect of cp at the sector level. It would thus be a
reasonable approach to take the average of proÖts of innovators over a large
number of products/technologies within a industry with varying values for ci.
This would presumably smooth out the previously mentioned discontinuities.
4.3 Entry and di§usion dynamics
Proposition 1 also has clear implications for entry dynamics of imitating Örms
in environments where innovators choose to protect through technical com-
plexity. There is initial entry of a certain number of Örms followed by a delay
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and then bunched entry of the remaining imitators. We discuss later in the
section how Proposition 1 can also have consequences for the path of di§usion
of innovations.
For our theory to be an interesting guide for empirical work on dynamic en-
try of imitators, it is useful to establish some comparative statics on the length
of the delay depending on the characteristics of the protection technologies.
Proposition 3 The expected delay until all imitators enter the market is
1. increasing for small variations in ci
2. weakly increasing in cp
Consider Örst the e§ect of ci, the cost of imitation of a protected technology.
This parameter a§ects directly the speed of entry in the waiting game played
by k outsiders (given in lemma 3 by kr(n  ci)=((k  1)ci)), but also a§ects
the critical value J that determines the expected number of Örms playing this
waiting game. To isolate the Örst e§ect, we consider only small variations
that do not a§ect the value of J .20 It is then clear that delay increases in ci:
the higher the imitation cost, the bigger the incentives to free ride on otherís
e§orts.
The e§ect of cp is slightly more intricate, we do not prove it formally but can
show it with numerical simulations and we provide some intuition as follows.
The cost of protection cp does not a§ect directly the speed of entry in the
waiting game. However it a§ects it indirectly through the e§ect on J and on
the probabilities of entry. In particular, as cp increases, J , the benchmark value
such that a waiting game starts, also weakly increases: paying the protection
cost is less attractive and thus players start more quickly the waiting game.
The Önal step of the argument is to note that an increase in the number of
outsiders playing the waiting game increases the delay: the aggregate speed
of entry of course mechanically increases in k, but each outsider strategically
takes this into account and actually overcorrects in the sense that equilibrium
20For a continuous distribution for ci, the set of values for ci such that J changes is of
zero measure.
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aggregate entry rate decreases. Overall, an increase in cp seems to increase the
delay.
We provide some basic evidence coherent with our story. We match at the
sector level the data on the popularity of patents, secrecy and lead time in
Cohen et al. (2000) to the data on average entry rates in Dunne et al. (1988).
We Önd a signiÖcant correlation of -.55 between average yearly entry and the
popularity of secrecy, but no correlation with the popularity of patents or lead
time.
This evidence is coherent with the result of Proposition 3 on the positive
e§ect of cp on delay, provided that the popularity of secrecy partly reáects an
increased use of complexity as a protection mechanism and thus potentially
a higher value of cp (we saw in the previous section that higher values of cp
can lead to higher proÖts for an innovator choosing complexity as a protection
mechanism). Of course this is just weakly suggestive evidence, and it would
be more convincing to show directly the link between entry and cp, but such
data is unfortunately not available to the best of our knowledge.21
We conclude this section by discussing the implications of Proposition 1
for the di§usion of innovations. Hoppe (2002) in a survey on the patterns of
di§usion, reports that a stylized fact in the literature is that "the adoption of
new technology is in general anything but instantaneous". If we view di§usion
of innovations as a process of imitation, Proposition 1 provides a foundation
for this delay. The empirical literature on di§usion is in fact not explicit about
what is the process of adoption of a technology, whether it is purchasing from
the inventor or whether it comes through imitation.
Our theory thus proposes an alternative explanation for this delay based
on strategic motives. It adds to quite a rich literature on the topic (see survey
by Hoppe (2002)). There is however a distinctive feature that allows to empir-
ically distinguish our theory from alternative ones: we predict delay followed
21It would also have been more appropriate to show correlations between entry and the
popularity of complexity, but the data in Cohen et al. (2000) does not include complexity
and for surveys that do (such as CIS survey), we do not have the data on sectorial variations.
Note however that the correlation with lead time is close to zero and that it is thus quite
likely that the correlation with secrecy is a sign of the e§ect of complexity.
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by bunched entry but also a certain mass of entry at the beginning. This
distinguishes our results from seminal work on adoption of new technologies
in oligopoly when a Örm does not need to imitate another one so as to enter
a new market.22 In particular, a stationary variant of Fudenberg and Tirole
(1985) would lead all Örms to enter simultaneously at the outset of the game.
Di§usion happens in their setting because the environment is not stationary
and the cost of adopting a new technology exogenously decreases over time.
In our stationary environment, di§usion still arises with non negligible prob-
ability, the reason being the incentive that imitators have to wait until one
of them enters without paying cp. Imitation-driven dynamics therefore have
di§erent fundamentals from those that arise in the absence of imitation, even
if outcomes seem similar. We believe that a proper understanding of di§usion
processes should consider whether Örms are imitating other ones or whether
they are using technological suppliers.
5 Conclusion
In this paper we show that the dynamic investment in complexity can generate
high rents for the innovators. Surprisingly, the protection technologies that
yield the highest returns for the innovator are expensive and do not protect
very well. We also show that our model has implications for the path of
di§usion of innovations.
We believe our model and results could be the basis for interesting empirical
work. At the very least it underlines the need for more comprehensive data on
two dimensions. First, little is still known on the cost of reverse-engineering
inventions, and how these costs vary by industry. Second, little information is
available on protection technologies, be it their cost or the level of protection
they confer. Although there is a large body of anecdotal evidence showing that
technological protection is commonly used, there is no systematic measurement
allowing for more detailed empirical analysis.
22See Hoppe (2002) for a description of papers in this large literature and how they relate
to each other.
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Proof of Lemma 1. Fudenberg and Tirole (1991) show that the unique
symmetric equilibrium of the discrete-time war of attrition with short period
lengths converges to the unique symmetric equilibrium of the war of attrition
in continuous time. This leads us to prove the result using the continuous-time
version of the game directly.
Counting from the date at which the subgame is Örst reached, let us con-
sider the expected payo§ of an outsider if she chooses to imitate at time  2
given that the other outsider chooses her imitation time according to an atom-
less and gapless distribution F2() with full support on [0;1) and density f2().
Given that the other Örm has made an unknown draw from F2(), a Örm who
enters at  2 expects to gain
bV2( 2) = Z 2
0
ne
rsdF2(s) +
Z 1
2
(n  ci)er2dF2(s).
In a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium, the Örm should be indi§erent among
all possible imitation times, which formally means that we should have that
dbV2( 2)=d 2 = 0 for all  2  0. Straightforward di§erentiation using the fact
that
R1
2
dF2(s) = 1 F2( 2) yields that
dbV2( 2)
d 2
= er2 [cif2( 2) r(n  ci)(1 F2( 2))].
Letting h2( 2)  f2( 2)=(1  F2( 2)) denote the hazard rate of F2() and
equating dbV2( 2)=d 2 to zero yields that the hazard rate is constant and equal
to h2( 2) = r(n  ci)=ci, so F2( 2) = 1  e22, where 2  r(n  ci)=ci.
Given that a probability distribution is exponential if and only if its hazard
rate is constant, the individual entry time follows an exponential distribution
with parameter 2 = r(n  ci)=ci.
Furthermore, since a Örm is indi§erent among all the pure strategies played
with positive density, the expected gain of an outsider converges toO2 = nci
(payo§ to imitating immediately).
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We have shown that both outsiders make independent draws from an expo-
nential distribution with the same hazard rate 2, so the time b of Örst entry
must be exponentially distributed with parameter 22. The expected payo§
for an insider is therefore given by:
I2 =
Z 1
0
Z b
0
n2ersds+
Z 1
b ne
rsds

22e
22bdb .
Integrating and letting 2  r=(r + 22) yields that:
I2 = 2n2 + (1 2)n.
Proof of Lemma 2. (i) As indicated in the main text, action p is weakly
dominated if cp  c2, so the outsiders mix every period between u and w.
Counting from the date at which the subgame is Örst reached, suppose that
two outsiders draw their time of imitation with an unprotected technology
using an atomless and gapless distribution function F3() with full support on
[0;1). Denoting these (random) draws by s and s0, we have that the expected
payo§ of an outsider if she imitates at time  3 with probability one (conditional
upon no other outsider imitating earlier) is
bV3( 3) = Z 3
0
ne
rsf3(s)(1 F3(s))ds+
Z 3
0
ne
rsf3(s0)(1 F3(s0))ds0
+(1 F3( 3))2(n  ci)er3.
Because it must hold that dbV3( 3)=d 3 = 0 for all  3  0, straightforward
computations show that we must have h3( 3)  f3( 3)=(1F3( 3)) = r(n
ci)=(2ci). Hence, F3( 3) = 1  e33, where 3  r(n  ci)=(2ci). Each
outsider expects to gain O3  n  ci (since bV3( 3) = n  ci for  3 = 0).
In turn, the fact that the time at which imitation takes place is exponentially
distributed with parameter 33 yields that the payo§ expected by the insiders
is
I3 = 3n3 + (1 3)n,
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where 3  r=(r + 33).
(ii) We now consider the case cp < c2. In principle, Örms will mix using
the three actions available to each of them, namely w, p and u. We denote
a;k  0 the probability with which one of the outsiders plays action a when k
outsiders remain to enter. We let Va;k denote the outsiderís payo§ when follow-
ing action a 2 fw; p; ug. In a mixed-strategy equilibrium in which outsiders
play stationary strategies, we must have that Vw;3 = Vp;3 = Vu;3, where
Vp;3 = 
2
w;3(n2+I2
)+2w;3(1w;3)(n1+n)+(1w;3)2ncicp
(2)
Vu;3 = 
2
w;3(n2+n
)+2w;3(1w;3)(n1+n)+(1w;3)2nci
(3)
and
Vw;3 = 
2
w;3(Vw;3
)+2w;3p;3O2
+(w;3+p;3+1)u;3n
+2p;3(nci).
(4)
Because Vp;3 = Vu;3, it holds after using the fact that w;3  0 that
w;3 =
r
cp
(I2  n)
. (5)
Using the working hypothesis that cp < c2  I2n yields that
cp
(I2  n)
<
, so w < 1 for  > 0 close enough to zero.
Because u;3 = 1  (w;3 + p;3) and O2 = n  ci, the expression for Vw;3
can be rewritten as follows:
Vw;3 =
(1 2w;3)n  p;3(p;3 + 2w;3)ci
  2w;3
.
Equating Vu;3 and Vw;3 yields the value for p;3  0 after some manipulations:
p;3 =
s
ci  (1 )Bn w;3(1 2w;3)C
ci
 w;3, (6)
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where B = (2 w;3)3w;3 + (1 w;3)2 and C = 2n1(1 w;3) + w;3n2.
Using the fact that I2n = 2(n2n), we Önd for small  > 0 that
w;3 
r
cp
2(n2  n)
,
p;3  1
r
cp
2(n2  n)
,
and
u;3  0,
that is, action u is played with positive but vanishing probability.
We now determine payo§s. To make exposition notationally simpler, let us
normalize to zero the date at which the subgame with three outsiders starts.
Given m periods of play between time 0 and some Öxed time t > 0, it holds
that the probability that no outsider has imitated and protected her technol-
ogy once time t has elapsed is (w;3)
3m = (w;3)
3t= (since m = t=), which
converges to zero as  converges to zero for any arbitrarily chosen t > 0. We
then must have that there is probability one that at least one outsider will
imitate and protect her technology (almost) instantaneously. In words, out-
siders correlate their actions as  goes to zero even though they randomize
independently.
We conclude the proof by characterizing the probability distribution over
entry outcomes at (normalized) time 0 as well as equilibrium payo§s. Because
the probability of no entry at any point in time is (1  p;3)3, it holds that
the probability that at least one outsider enters is 1 (1 p;3)3. Conditional
upon at least one outsider entering, we then have that
3(3) = (p;3)
3=(1 (1 p;3)3),
3(2) = 3(1 p;3)(p;3)2=(1 (1 p;3)3),
and
3(1) = 3(1 p;3)2p;3=(1 (1 p;3)3), (7)
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where k(l) denotes the probability that l  1 outsiders enter simultaneously
at 0 given that there are k  l of them. We Önally observe that an outsiderís
continuation payo§ at the beginning of these subgames is approximately O3 =
n  ci (since Vp;3 = Vu;3 = Vw;3  n  ci for small enough  > 0). Since
I1 = I0 = n, the expected payo§ earned by an insider is approximately
I3 = 3(1)I2 + (1 3(1))n.
Proof of Proposition 1. Proposition 1 directly follows from Lemmas
1-4.
Proof of Lemma 3. We prove the result by induction. Lemma 2
established the result for k = 3, so it only remains to prove that it holds for
k  4 whenever it is true for k 1. So suppose that the result holds for k 1,
and consider the subgames with k outsiders when cp  ck1.
Let us focus on an outsiderís incentive to play p. Since cj < c

k1 (see proof
in main text) for all j < k  1, he knows when choosing action p that p being
simultaneously chosen by l  0 other imitators will result in the remaining
outsiders playing a waiting game (by the induction hypothesis). Clearly, the
highest payo§ that can be achieved is the one attained when no other outsider
enters simultaneously, i.e., when l = 0. Thus, the highest payo§ she can obtain
by entering and paying the protection cost is Ik1  cp  ci = k1nk+1 +
(1k1)n cp ci. Since cp  ck1 implies Ik1 cp ci < n ci, it then
follows that no outsider must be willing to enter by paying the protection cost
in subgames with k outsiders.
The k outsiders will therefore mix between waiting and entering without
protection. Counting from the date at which the subgame is Örst reached, let
us suppose that the outsiders draw their time of imitation with an unprotected
technology using an atomless and gapless distribution function Fk() with full
support on [0;1). We then have that the expected payo§ of an outsider if she
imitates at time  k with probability one (conditional upon no other outsider
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imitating earlier) is
bVk( k) = (k1) Z k
0
ne
rsfk(s)(1Fk(s))ds+(1Fk( k))k1(nci)erk .
In order for such an outsider to be indi§erent between all the possible imitation
times, it is easy to show that we must have that Fk( k) = 1  ekk , where
k  r(nci)=((k1)ci). Each of the outsiders expects to gain Ok  nci
(since bVk( k) = n  ci for  k = 0). In addition, because the time at which
the Örst imitation takes place is exponentially distributed with parameter kk,
the expected proÖt of an insider is given by
Ik = knk + (1 k)n,
where k  r=(r + kk).
Proof of Lemma 4. As explained in the main text, we solve for the
approximation of the equilibrium outcome, taking directly the solution for a
time period of length  = 0. We show this result in a number of steps
Step 1: u;k = 0.
We show this result by induction. For  = 0, we have
Vu;J = n  ci
and
Vw;J = Pr[Xw;J = J  1; Xp;J = 0; Xu;J = 0] Vw;J +
J1X
m=1
J1mX
l=0
Pr[Xw;J = J  1 l m;Xp;J = l; Xu;J = m] n +
J1X
l=1
Pr[Xw;J = J  1 l; Xp;J = l; Xu;J = 0] OJl,
where Pr[Xw;k; Xp;k; Xu;k] denotes the probability that Xw;k outsiders choose
w, Xp;k outsiders choose p and Xu;k outsiders choose u. We know, that for all
k < J , a waiting game is played and, according to Lemma 3, Ok = n ci, so
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the system of equations can be rewritten as
Vu;J = n  ci
and
Vw;J = Pr[Xw;J = J  1; Xp;J = 0; Xu;J = 0] Vw;J +
(1 Pr[Xw;J = J  1; Xp;J = 0; Xu;J = 0]) n 
J1X
l=1
Pr[Xw;J = J  1 l; Xp;J = l; Xu;J = 0] ci
In a mixed-strategy equilibrium, an outsider must be indi§erent between all
actions played with positive probability, so we must have Vu;J = Vw;J , which
implies that
J1X
l=1
Pr[Xw;J = J1l; Xp;J = l; Xu;J = 0] = (1Pr[Xw;J = J1; Xp;J = 0; Xu;J = 0]) = 1.
This holds if and only if
J1X
l=0
Pr[Xw;J = J  1 l; Xp;J = l; Xu;J = 0] = 1,
hence we get that u;J = 0. Furthermore, this implies that OJ = n  ci, and
the property is therefore true for k = J . The reasoning follows exactly the
same lines for larger values of k. We can therefore use the notation adopted
in the main text where k  p;k
Step 2: k is the unique solution to Fk(k) = cp.
Consider Örst the "last preemption game", i.e., the subgame where J out-
siders are left to enter. As shown in the main text, the indi§erence between
actions p and w is deÖned by
FJ(J) = cp,
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where
FJ() =
J1X
l=0
C lJ1 
l(1 )J1l IJ1l.
Note that following entry by at least one outsider, a waiting game is played (by
deÖnition of J). The speed is determined by the number of other outsiders who
enter. Note that according to Lemma 3, IJ1l = J1l(n(J1l)  n) =
cJ1l. We showed previously that c

k is an increasing function of k. So we
have IJ1 > IJ2 > ::: > I0, and it can be immediately observed that FJ() is
a strictly decreasing function of . Indeed, increasing  shifts the distribution
to states where the payo§ is lower.
Furthermore, J = inffk  3 : cp < ck1g implies that FJ(0) = IJ1 =
cJ1 > cp. Since FJ(1) = I0 = 0 and FJ() is a continuous and strictly
decreasing function, it then follows that the equation FJ() = cp has a unique
solution J 2 (0; 1).
We now work recursively with Fk+1() for k  J . We use the following key
properties of Fk+1() proven below:
 Property 1:
@Fk+1
@
() = (
k
1 )(Fk() Fk+1()).
 Property 2:
@Fk+1
@
(0) > 0.
 Property 3:
Ik = Fk+1(k).
From Properties 1 and 2, we can conclude that Fk+1() is increasing at
zero, reaches a maximum when Fk+1() and Fk() cross and is then decreasing.
Furthermore, we know that Fk+1(1) = I0 = 0. So to establish that Fk+1() =
cp has a unique solution it is su¢cient to show that Fk+1(0) > cp. To prove it,
note that we have Fk+1(0) = Ik, and Property 3 implies that Ik = Fk+1(k),
so it holds that Fk+1(0) = Fk+1(k). Because Fk+1() is increasing at zero
according to Property 2, the unique maximum must be reached somewhere
38
between 0 and k. According to Property 1, we know that Fk+1() > Fk() for
  k, and therefore Fk+1(k) > Fk(k). Taking into account that Fk+1(0) =
Fk+1(k), as we just showed, and that Fk(k) = cp, it follows that Fk+1(0) > cp.
Step 3: (i) follows directly from steps 1 and 2. We also showed above
that Fk+1() > cp for  2 (0; k), so we must that have k < k+1, which proves
(ii). Finally (iii) can be shown as in the proof of Lemma 2.
To conclude the proof we show that properties 1-3 state above do hold:
Property 1 We have that
Fk() =
k1X
l=0
C lk1 ()
l(1 )k1l Ik1l
and
Fk+1() =
kX
l=0
C lk ()
l(1 )kl Ikl. (8)
So we can establish that
Fk() Fk+1() =
k1X
l=0
C lk1 ()
l(1 )k1l Ik1l 
kX
l=0
C lk ()
l(1 )kl Ikl
=
kX
l=1
C l1k1 ()
l1(1 )kl Ikl 
kX
l=1
C lk ()
l(1 )kl Ikl  (1 )k Ik.(9)
Consider
@Fk+1
@
() =
kX
l=0
C lk

l()l1(1 )kl  (k  l)()l(1 )kl1 Ikl
=
kX
l=0
C lk ()
l1(1 )kl1(l  k) Ikl
=
kX
l=1
C lk ()
l1(1 )kl1(l  k) Ikl  k(1 )k1Ik, (10)
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so that
@Fk+1
@
() =
kX
l=1
lC lk ()
l1(1)kl1 Iklk
kX
l=1
C lk ()
l(1)kl1 Iklk(1)k1Ik.
Given that C l1k1 = lC
l
k=k, using (9) yields:
@Fk+1
@
() = (
k
1 )(Fk() Fk+1()), (11)
as claimed.
Properties 2 and 3 We have that
@Fk
@
() =
k1X
l=0
C lk1

l()l1(1 )k1l  (k  1 l)()l(1 )kl2 Ik1l
=
k1X
l=1
C lk1 ()
l1(1 )kl2 [l  (k  1)] Ik1l  (k  1)(1 )k2Ik1,
so
@Fk
@
(0) = (k  1)(Ik1  Ik2) (12)
for k  J + 1.
Denote now bIk() for the expected payo§ to an insider when there are
k outsiders who choose to enter with probability  (the expectation being
conditional upon at least one outsider entering). Then
bIk() = kX
l=1
C lk
()l(1 )kl
1 (1 )k Ikl, (13)
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so straightforward manipulations yield:
(1 (1 )k) bIk() = kX
l=1
C lk ()
l(1 )kl Ikl
=
kX
l=0
C lk ()
l(1 )kl Ikl  (1 )k Ik
= Fk+1() (1 )k Ik.
If there existed a unique k satisfying Fk(k) = cp, then we would have bIk(k) =
Ik, so using the previous equality for  = k would yield
(1 (1 k)k) Ik = Fk+1(k) (1 k)k Ik,
that is, an insiderís expected payo§ (net of n) when k outsiders remain to
enter would satisfy
Ik = Fk+1(k) (14)
if a unique k satisfying Fk(k) = cp existed.
Because we know that there exists a unique J satisfying FJ(J) = cp, it
simply remains to prove that
@Fk
@
(0) > 0, that is, Ik1 < Ik2 for k  J + 1,
which follows from working recursively on k as in Vettas (2000).23
Proof of Proposition 2. Let ci < n. If cp  2, then J = n and
In1  cp = n11 + (1 n1)n  cp.
Note that In1  cp is decreasing in cp for cp  2, whereas it increases in
ci < n. In particular, cp # 2 and ci " n implies that In1  cp converges
to 1  2 from below (since n1 " 1). When ci  n, cp  2 implies that
J 0 = n, so In1  cp = 1  cp, which implies that In1  cp converges to
23Notice that expressions (4a), (5a) and (6)-(9) in Vettas (2000) are equivalent to ex-
pressions (1), (14), (8) for  = 0, (11), Fk(1) = 0 < cp, and (12), respectively. Note
that the expression that turns out to be equivalent in our setting to (10) in Vettas (2000)
(namely, Fk+1(0) > Ik) actually holds with equality, and hence it is redundant based on the
expression in (8) evaluated at  = 0.
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1  2 as cp # 2.
Proof of Lemma 5. Let cp 2 [cJ2; cJ1) for some integer J between 3
and n, and consider the subgames with k  J outsiders.
(i) Working backwards, we Örst show that cp " cJ1 implies that one, and
only one, of the k  J outsiders enters, even though each of them chooses
action p with negligible probability (i.e., k # 0 as cp " cJ1 for all k  J).
Given k = J outsiders, the probability that one outsider enters conditional
upon at least one of them entering equals
J(1) =
JJ(1 J)J1
1 (1 J)J
.
Since J # 0 as cp " cJ1, it follows from LíHÙpitalís rule that
lim
cp"cJ1
J(1) = 1
(J  1)J
1 J
= 1,
so one, and only one, outsider (out of the J existing ones) enters as cp " cJ1.
This also implies that IJ = IJ1, so it also follows that J+1 # 0 as cp " cJ1,
with limcp"cJ1 J+1(1) = 1 and IJ+1 = IJ = IJ1. Iteration then yields
for all k  J that k # 0 as cp " cJ1, with limcp"cJ1 k(1) = 1 and Ik =
IJ1, so outsiders enter quasi-instantaneously by paying cp in a sequential and
coordinated manner, with each having the same probability of entry as any
other outsider in any subgame in which k  J . Because these results hold for
any arbitrary value of J and Ik = IJ1 = cJ1 for all k  J , we have that
limcp"cJ1(In1 cp) = 0 regardless of the value taken by J , so In1 cp = n.
Having shown that the innovatorís net proÖts In1  cp converge to n as
cp " cJ1 for any integer value of J between 3 and n, we now prove that the
convergence is from above by showing that the innovatorís net proÖt has a
negative derivative as cp " cJ1. In subgames in which k  J , we showed (see
(13) noticing that bIk(k) = Ik) that an insiderís continuation payo§ (net of
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n) satisÖes the recursive equation
Ik =
kX
l=1
C lk
(k)
l(1 k)kl
1 (1 k)k
Ikl,
since at least one of them enters immediately. Noticing that k is an (implicit)
function given by Fk(k) = cp and that k # 0 as cp " cJ1, we have that
@Ik
@cp
=
kX
l=1
C lk
(k)
l(1 k)kl
1 (1 k)k

@Ikl
@cp

+
kX
l=1
C lk(
l(k)
l1(1 k)k1l
1 (1 k)k
 k(k)
l(1 k)k1l
(1 (1 k)k)2
)Ikl

@k
@cp

.
Making (repeated) use of LíHÙpitalís rule, it follows that
@Ik
@cp

cp"cJ1
= C1k
1
k
 
@Ik1
@cp

cp"cJ1
!


C1k
(k  1)
2k
Ik1  C2k
1
k
Ik2
 
@k
@cp

cp"cJ1
!
=
 
@Ik1
@cp

cp"cJ1
!
 (k  1)(Ik1  Ik2)
2
 
@k
@cp

cp"cJ1
!
,
where
@k
@cp

cp"cJ1
=
 
dFk(k)
dk

k#0
!1
< 0,
since the derivative of Fk() is negative for  = k.
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